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LUMPING AS DEFAULT IN TORT CASES:
THE CULTURAL INTERPRETATION OF
INJURY AND CAUSATION
DavidM Engel*
Empirical studies of the tort law system suggest that "lumping," or
decisions by victims to do without adequate remedies, should be
regarded as the predominant response to injury in American society
and elsewhere. Yet research on lumping remains conceptually
impoverishedand gives insufficient attention to the culturalftameworks
victims use to interpret their experiences and determine their responses.
This Article presents the stories of injury victims in Thailand and
compares their common-sense understandings of torts and tort law to
those of injured Americans. It argues that analyses of lumping in
America as well as Asia should take into account the ways in which
fundamental cultural constructs,such as understandingsof the Self and
of moral responsibility,give meaning to key tort law concepts such as
"injury" and "causation," which in turn shape the behavior of injury
victims.

* SUNY Distinguished Service Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law, State
University of New York. dmengel@buffalo.edu.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There was a time not too long ago when it was accurate to say
that research on the actual workings of the tort law system was
sparse, uneven, and unsophisticated, particularly in comparison to
research on the criminal justice system. As recently as 1992, an
article that is still one of the finest overviews of the tort law system
bore a title that reflected the author's frustration with the inadequacy
of the research literature: Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?' Nearly two
decades after this Michael J. Saks article appeared, the situation has
improved significantly. An abundance of empirical research now
addresses many aspects of the tort law system, including litigation
rates, 2 jury behavior, 3 tort lawyers,' insurance, 5 punitive damage
awards, 6 the impact of race and gender,' the media,' and the use of
1. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
2. E.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093
(1996); John T. Nockleby, How to Manufacture a Crisis: Evaluating Empirical Claims Behind
"Tort Reform, " 86 OR. L. REV. 533 (2007).
3. E.g., NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (2007);
Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury, 54 BUFF. L.
REV. 717 (2006); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective,40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849 (1998).
4. E.g., Lynn Mather, Lawyers and Solicitors Separatedby a Common Legal System: AntiTobacco Litigation in the United States and Britain, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL
PRACTICE 192 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009); Tom Baker, Blood Money, New
Money and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 275 (2001);
Herbert M. Kritzer, Defending Torts: What Should We Know?, I J. TORT L. 3 (2007).
5. E.g., Tom Baker, Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crime Boundary, in FAULT LINES:
TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 66; Tom Baker, Liability Insuranceas Tort
Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1
(2006); Albert Yoon & Tom Baker, Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An Empirical
Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East, 59 VAND. L. REV. 155 (2006); Kathryn
Zeiler et al., Physicians' Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas
Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S9 (2007).
6. E.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, Change, and the Politics of
Ideas: Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 71 (1998); Marc Galanter & David
Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993);
Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes
with EmpiricalData,78 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992).
7. E.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010); Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in OrdinaryTort Cases: Race,
Gender, and the Calculationof Economic Loss, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1435 (2005); Lucinda M.
Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847
(1997).
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tort law in particular types of cases such as medical malpractice,'
products liability,o and tobacco litigation."
This burgeoning research literature has deepened our
understanding of tort law in society and has refuted many of the
myths and stereotypes that have become so stubbornly rooted in
public and professional perceptions. What have we learned? For one
thing, it now seems completely uncontroversial to assert that most
injuries go without a remedy, not only in our own society, but also
across legal systems. "Lumping," it appears, is the universal default
mode for resolving injury cases. 2 Some may find this fact
regrettable," while others may wish that lumping were even more
widespread in our supposedly litigious society.14 The purpose of this
8.

E.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS,

MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004);William Haltom & Michael McCann, FramingFastFood Litigation: Tort Claims, Mass Media, and the Politics ofResponsibility in the UnitedStates,
in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 97; Robert J. MacCoun,

Media Reporting of Jury Verdicts: Is the Tail (of the Distribution) Wagging the Dog?, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 539 (2006).
9.

E.g., TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005); David A. Hyman &

Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice and Tort Reform: It's the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 1085 (2006); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors and Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (2007);
Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms' Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and
Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905 (2008).
10. E.g., Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability
Versus Negligence: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874 (2002); John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law, A Response to Professors
Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REv. 1919 (2010); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore
Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An EmpiricalStudy of Legal Change, 37
UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Casefor Product
Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (2010).
11. E.g., DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES:
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION (2010); REGULATING TOBACCO

(Robert Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001); Mather, supra note 4; Lynn Mather,
TheorizingAbout Trial Courts:Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation,23 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 897 (1998).

12. "Lumping" in this Article refers to outcomes in injury cases in which the individual who
suffers harm makes no claim against the injurer for any kind of remedy or accepts a token
settlement that he or she considers inadequate. The term "lumping" gained currency in sociolegal
circles with the publication of William L.F. Felstiner's Influences of Social Organization on
Dispute Processing: "In lumping it the salience of the dispute is reduced not so much by limiting
the contacts between the disputants, but by ignoring the dispute, by declining to take any or much
action in response to the controversy." William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization
on Dispute Processing,9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 63, 81 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Rick Abel, The Real Tort Crisis: Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 447
(1987) (arguing that the real problem with the tort system is not litigiousness but a crisis of
underclaiming).
14. E.g., PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
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Article is not to embrace either of these normative positions or to
propose specific measures that would increase-or decrease-the
availability of remedies for those who suffer injuries. Rather, I will
argue that our view of the issue itself has remained conceptually
impoverished despite the increased attention empirical researchers
have paid to tort law.
To understand why so many injury victims "lump" their
misfortunes, we should examine popular understandings of the
concept of injury itself and the concept of causation that links the
injury victim to potential remedy agents. I will argue that the
attribution of meaning to both of these concepts-injury and
causation-involves a complex interpretive process. Both concepts
are defined by the convergence of ideas and practices that vary
across social settings and across social groups within those settings.
Moreover, to parse either concept, it is necessary to consider its
definitional dependence on other closely related concepts.
Specifically, ideas about injury are linked to ideas about the Self who
is vulnerable to harm, and ideas about causation are linked to ideas
about moral responsibility. " The challenge for the sociolegal
analysis of tort law, then, is to view both injuries and remedies as
cultural constructs and to theorize how these constructs evolve and
transform over time and in different social and economic
circumstances. Responding to this challenge may help researchers
deal more thoughtfully with the issue of injuries without remedies,
which is the broader theme of this Symposium issue.
In this Article, then, I want to endorse a recent movement
among some sociolegal scholars to view injuries, remedies, and tort
law in relation to an array of cultural practices and categories
through which injury victims give meaning to their experiences and
gravitate-or are compelled-toward particular responses. 16 This
culturally oriented perspective on tort law provides a necessary
supplement to the extremely valuable but primarily positivist
depictions of injuries and remedies that predominate in the current
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991); Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the "Crisis" in the Civil Justice
System Real or Imagined?, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1121 (2005).
15. See discussion infra Parts III-IV.
16. See generally FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE, supra note 4

(presenting interdisciplinary studies of tort law issues, actors, and institutions viewed in relation
to their cultural settings in the United States, Europe, and Asia).
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empirical research literature." Most often, sociolegal researchers
have described the behavior of the tort law system in terms of a
sequence of discrete decision points, as exemplified by the decision
tree appearing in a landmark study of accidental injuries published
by the RAND Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice:
Deal directly
with injurer
2%*

*Because multiple paths could be pursued,
these percentages sum to more than 10%.

This chart illustrates the classic model underlying most
sociolegal scholarship on tort law. Turned on its side, the decision
tree becomes the injury "pyramid" that has provided the basis for
most of the empirical research on tort law conducted during the past
few decades, including my own. Analysis focuses on the choices
injured persons make at each step along the way: the vast majority
(81 percent), according to the RAND study, did not consider

17. Id.
18. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 122 (1991).
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claiming.19 Of the 19 percent who did consider claiming, nearly half
took no action.20 The remaining 10 percent of those who had been
injured made several different, sometimes overlapping, choices:
dealing directly with the injurer (2 percent), dealing directly with an
insurer (4 percent), and consulting an attorney (7 percent).21 The
behavior of the tort law system in this model comprises a series of
binary choices made by the injured party. 22 Each decision point
could in turn become the subject of further study as researchers
attempt to identify the factors that would lead an individual to choose
or reject a particular option. Ultimately, this model provides a view
of cases proceeding toward greater levels of institutional formality,
although the real story, as Saks and others have long reminded us, is
the extraordinary attrition that occurs en route.23 Far more cases drop
out of the process than move forward step by step to a setting in
which a remedy might be provided. Lumping is presumably the
outcome in many or most of the cases that fall by the wayside,
particularly in those that drop out in the initial stages before the
injury victim deals with the injurer, an insurer, or an attorney. 24
For all that this decision tree or pyramid model has contributed
to knowledge of the real behavior of the tort law system, it has also
diverted attention from underlying considerations that might help to
explain why nine out of ten injury victims take no action at allwhy, that is, most injuries go without remedies. To gain insight into
the interpretive frameworks that shape the perception of harmful
events from the very outset, we must go beyond a model based on
binary decisions made by rational actors as they move from one end
of a flow chart to the other. Intead, we must consider in greater depth
the subjective thought processes and conceptual categories of
ordinary people who have suffered harm-and of others who may
have an interest in their injuries.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id
See id. at 121-22.
See, e.g., Saks, supra note 1, at 1183-89.
See id.
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In this Article, I draw on examples of injury narratives from my
own fieldwork in northern Thailand.25 Each of the three substantive
sections of the Article begins with a description of an interview with
a man or woman hospitalized because of serious injuries. In my
fieldwork, I interviewed a number of accident victims during or
shortly after their treatment in a hospital in Chiangmai, Thailand, as
part of a larger study of injury, law, and social change in a society
transformed by globalization.26 The social and cultural setting may
seem distant and unfamiliar from a North American perspective, but
I found many of the same dynamics and constitutive processes in
Thailand that I and others have encountered in American settings.27
It is perhaps easier to discern the operation of key cultural factors
from a distance rather than in a narrative where all the concepts and
images seem overly familiar and tend to be taken for granted.
In Part II, which begins with an account offered by an injury
victim named Prayat," I set forth some general observations about
the narratives of lumping that I encountered in Asian and American
settings. In Part III, after a brief account by an injury victim named
Pinkaeo, I discuss the relationship between lumping, the social
construction of "injury," and the close connection between concepts
of injury and concepts of the Self in Thailand and the United States.
In Part IV, which begins with an injury narrative by Thipha, I discuss
the relationship between lumping and the social construction of
25. Descriptions and detailed examples of injury narratives appear in DAVID M. ENGEL &
JARUWAN S. ENGEL, TORT, CUSTOM, AND KARMA: GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS IN THAILAND (2010). In our fieldwork, we interviewed thirty-five current or
recent hospital patients, selected from a group of ninety-three injury victims admitted for medical
treatment over a four-month period. The qualitative, open-ended interviews were part of a larger
study that involved more than one hundred interviews with village leaders, insurance adjusters,
attorneys, judges, monks, spirit mediums, Thai scholars, doctors, government officials, and
others. In addition, we conducted an exhaustive docket study of every injury case litigated in the
Chiangmai Provincial Court from 1992 to 1997. We photocopied and analyzed the pleadings,
motions, and judgments in every case file and compared our findings to similar data we had
previously gathered in the same court for cases litigated from 1965 to 1974.
26. See id.
27. E.g., David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and PersonalInjuries
in an American Community, 18 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 551 (1984) (presenting findings from a study
of formal and informal resolution of injury cases in a small community in the American
Midwest); see also CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND COMMUNITY INTHREE AMERICAN
TOWNS (1994) (comparing the findings of ethnographic research conducted by David Engel in a
Midwestern American community, Carol Greenhouse in a suburban-community in the American
South, and Barbara Yngvesson in a small New England community).
28. Pseudonyms are used for all interviewees cited in this Article.
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"causation," as well as the linkages between concepts of causation
and concepts of responsibility. Part V offers some general
conclusions about lumping as a form of cultural practice.
II. DISCOURSES OF LUMPING
Prayat, a forty-seven-year-old agricultural extension worker,
suffered multiple leg fractures in a traffic accident. His description of
the accident makes it clear that he considers his injury the fault of a
careless driver whose car collided with his motorcycle:
I was returning from a dinner honoring a colleague at a
restaurant near the new provincial office building in Mae
Jo. It was around nine or ten in the evening. I had had a few
drinks, but I wasn't drunk. Anyway, I tend to drive my
motorcycle quite slowly, and I always keep to the left
[Thailand follows the British practice of driving on the left
side of the road]. At the intersection, a car cut right in front
of me and struck my motorcycle. That's how I was injured.
If I had been driving fast, it would have been very serious. I
was taken to the hospital in an ambulance. The other driver
was in a car, not a motorcycle, so he wasn't hurt at all. He
stopped after the accident and went to the hospital when I
was admitted. He told my wife that he'd come back again
the next day to arrange things, but he never came. Since
that day, I've never seen him, but I didn't file any sort of
claim or complaint. 29
Prayat is well aware that he could have pursued a remedy
through official channels. If he had submitted a report to the police,
he could have exerted pressure on the other driver to pay an out-ofcourt settlement. He could even have filed a tort claim. Although
quite rare, tort cases do appear on the docket of the Chiangmai
Provincial Court.3 0 From 1992 to 1997, sixty-six personal injury
claims were litigated in Chiangmai. 3 The average damage award in
such cases was 189,152 baht (at that time, approximately $4,730),
and the average court-approved settlement during the same period
29. All quotations from interviews with Thai individuals are the author's translations from
Thai-language transcriptions of the original audio recordings. The transcripts are on file with the
author.
30. See ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 25, at 95-122.

31. See id. at 102 tbl.5.1.
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was 100,000 baht (approximately $2,500). 32 Thai tort law might have
permitted Prayat to recover damages not only for costs incurred
during medical treatment," but also for current and future lost

earnings3 4 and pain and suffering.35
Prayat knew that he could have lodged a valid claim for a
substantial amount of money against the other driver, a merchant
driving a large car, who was evidently negligent and had sufficient
resources to respond to a tort judgment. Yet, Prayat elected to lump
his injury. Since Prayat was a government official, his medical bills
were covered and he did not suffer a loss of wages. Nevertheless,
both as a matter of law and informal practice, he was clearly entitled
to substantial compensation from the other driver. His narrative of
lumping continues with a description of events following admission
to the hospital:
If he had any compassion, he would have come to see me.
He never came, so I don't have to give it any thought. I
didn't feel very good about the way he behaved. One day an
insurance company representative for the other driver came
to see me, but I never followed up on that. I never did
anything about it. The other driver never spoke to me
himself. In fact, I never saw his face. Since I work for the
government, I was able to charge the medical expenses, so I
didn't have any financial problem. But my leg was badly
swollen, and a number of bones were broken.
If I filed a police report or a legal claim, it would just
take a lot of time. I didn't want to have any conflict. I just
felt it was my own bad karma. If the police had been there
at the time, they would have charged him with a serious
offense. His insurance company actually phoned me twice,
and I just told them, "I don't want to get involved. I'm not
interested in getting anything from anyone." They wanted

32. Id. at 117. By comparison, in 1998 the average monthly income per household in
Thailand was 12,492 baht. NAT'L STATISTICAL OFFICE, CORE ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF

THAILAND (2004), available at http://unpan.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/
unpanO15286.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
33. CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE OF THAILAND
34. Id.

35. See id. §446.

§ 444.
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me to fill out the forms so they could pay me, but I refused.
I didn't want to have anything to do with them.
I'm a person who doesn't like to have any problem
with anyone. I told my family not to bother filing a police
report, not to notify them about his license number, and so
forth. I didn't want to put the effort into that kind of thing,
going to the police station, and so on. So I chose not to
pursue it. I just chalk it up to my own karma. It was just my
time to get injured.
Most of the interviewees in northern Thailand shared Prayat's
preference for lumping. None of them brought a tort claim. None
received a substantial remedy, and most-like Prayat-received little
or no compensation. Prayat knew that he had other options. It would
have been a simple matter to complete the documentation that the
injurer's insurance company wanted to send him. Moreover, Prayat
was not intimidated or afraid to take on the injurer, who was not a
person of greater wealth or power. Prayat was a mid-range
government official, which gave him some status in the local society,
and his monthly salary of 14,500 baht (then approximately $363)
made him one of the wealthiest of the injury victims who
participated in our study. He explained his choice of lumping not in
terms of domination by a powerful adversary, but in terms of local
norms and religious beliefs opposed to materialism and conflict:
People in the North, maybe we just have meritorious spirits.
That's just how we are. If something is destined to happen,
then we just let it go. This has to do with our moral code,
the ethics we learned in school when the religious teachers
instructed us. Everything we learned, every branch of our
instruction has molded us. Buddhism teaches people to do
only good, and we keep that sort of thing in our minds at all
times. That's why our society is like this.
Prayat's response to his injury was typical of virtually all our
Thai interviewees. " Whether the injurer was rich or poor, powerful
or powerless, the injury victims never brought a tort action and rarely
pursued a complaint of any kind beyond informal settlement
negotiations in the police station. Generally speaking, the
interviewees received no compensation at all or token settlements
36. See ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 25.
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and trivial no-fault motor vehicle insurance payments. In short, most
injuries went without remedies.
Although it may seem remarkable that most Thai injury victims
were ready to forego claims to which they appeared entitled, studies
of injury victims in the United States suggest many similarities. As
the RAND study found, only one in ten accident victims brought a
claim of any kind, only one out of twenty-five hired an attorney, and
only one in fifty filed a lawsuit.3 7 It might be countered that the
accidents in the RAND study were not necessarily tortious and that
lumping by the injury victim could have been legally appropriate in
the cases in which negligence did not cause the accident. The Saks
study, however, traced a large sample of medical injury cases in
which a neutral panel of doctors had concluded that physician
negligence was the probable cause of harm." Even in those
presumably tortious injury cases, only 4 percent of the victims
consulted a lawyer, and only 2 percent filed lawsuits." In short,
lumping appears widely prevalent in the United States even for
injuries probably caused by negligence.
Some years ago, I had the opportunity to interview residents of a
Midwestern American community about their experiences with and
perceptions of the law. 40 The farmers, townspeople, and factory
workers that I interviewed in "Sander County," Illinois, 4 ' explained
to me why injury victims seldom lodged claims and even less often
brought tort actions. Even when someone else's negligence had
clearly caused an injury, according to one farmer, "Most of us would
just think it's one of life's little accidents." 4 2 Another farmer added,
"Farm kids, you know, are quite prone to having accidents, and
they're kind of used to it, I think. Usually just pick up and go on, and
that's all." Townspeople agreed with this characterization of the local
ethos. A school administrator referred to the traditional attitude of
the local residents "whose macho says, take care of it yourself first."
37. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 18, at 122.

38. Saks, supra note 1,at 1178-79.
39. Id. at 1194.
40. See GREENHOUSE ET AL., supra note 27, at 31-32; David M. Engel, Cases, Conflict, and
Accommodation: Patterns of Legal Interaction in an American Community, 8 LAW & Soc.

INQUIRY 803 (1983); Engel, supra note 27, at 557.
41. "Sander County," Illinois is a pseudonym used to protect a community and the
otherwise-identifiable individuals who lived there.
42. All Sander County quotes are from interview transcripts on file with the author.
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A minister agreed that a longtime resident who suffered an injury
would think, "I can handle it myself." As one insurance adjuster
observed, it did not occur to most people that they could even file a
routine claim against the injurer's liability insurance:
We have some people that have had their kid injured on our
insured's property, and they were not our insured. And we
call up and offer to pay their bills, because our insured has
called and said my kid Tommy cracked that kid over the
head with a shovel and they hauled him off to the hospital.
And I called the people and say we have medical coverage
and they are absolutely floored, some of them, that it never
even crossed their minds. They were just going to turn it in
to their own little insurance, their health insurance, and not
do anything about it whatsoever, especially if [Tommy's
parents] are close friends. . . .43
The views expressed by Sander County residents serve as a
reminder that, even in an American setting, social norms and
practices can influence the perspective of injury victims and lead
them to view potentially tortious injuries as one of "life's little
accidents" and as matters one should handle oneself." As I have
suggested elsewhere, the viewpoint expressed by many of the
longtime Sander County residents derived from a particular type of
individualism that emphasizes self-sufficiency rather than rights.4 5
The predominance of that perspective in Sander County reflected the
longstanding practices of a closely interrelated farming community
as well as a reaction against newcomers to the community who did
not necessarily share the views of the old-timers.46 Even though this
philosophy of self-sufficiency differs somewhat from that of the
Chiangmai injury victims, it leads to a similar result: lumping, or at
most settling for a token or symbolic payment by the injurer or an
insurance company.
In short, discourses of lumping come in many forms in different
social and cultural settings. To understand the salience and ubiquity
43. Engel, supra note 27, at 562.
44. Id. at 553. See generally SARAH S. LOCHLANN JAIN, INJURY: THE POLITICS OF PRODUCT
DESIGN AND SAFETY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 4-8 (2006) (discussing the processes through
which injuries come to be seen as unexceptional aspects of normal life).
45. Engel, supra note 27, at 558-59.
46. Id
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of such discourses, we must probe more deeply into the underlying
conceptions of injury and causation.
III. CULTURAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
INJURY AND THE INJURED SELF
Stories of lumping in tort cases begin with an injury, but injuries
are not clearly defined social facts about which everyone would
agree. An outside observer might conclude that a person had suffered
an injury, but the individual in question might not share that
perception. The reverse might also be true-an outsider might not
perceive an injury when the individual in question is certain that he
or she has suffered harm. Furthermore, the nature or essence of an
injury may be viewed differently depending on one's underlying
assumption about the effect of trauma, suffering, or illness on the
human personality. Thus, the meaning and the very existence of an
injury depends on a complex interpretive process, which in turn is
linked to variable concepts about the constituent parts of the Selfwhat makes the person a human being and what aspects of humans
are susceptible to harm? This part begins with a story told by
Pinkaeo, a forty-year-old accident victim from northern Thailand,
who worked with her husband in a Chiangmai sign-making business.
Pinkaeo was injured while riding in the passenger seat of a
motorcycle driven by her husband. They were struck from behind by
a teenager, who may have been drunk. In the crash, Pinkaeo was
knocked unconscious and suffered extensive head injuries requiring
surgery to implant a metal plate in her skull.
Pinkaeo lives in Chiangmai City, but she was raised in a farming
village in a rural area. When she was born at home, her mother
presented her to the guardian spirits of the household and of the
village, thereby "registering" the new addition to the family and
asking the spirits to protect her from harm. In this way, Pinkaeo's
personality from birth became part of the fabric of family and village
relationships. According to traditional village customary law, harm
to one family member or villager was believed to injure others in the
close-knit farming community. When she became an adult, however,
Pinkaeo left the village, and she no longer lives in a community in
which all of the villagers' identities are closely connected.
As Shigeharu Tanabe and other scholars have observed,
personhood among villagers in northern Thailand was traditionally
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understood to be relational, rather than sharply individuated, and had
"no solid boundaries," because of the Self s connection to and
internalization of the spirits of fellow villagers. 7 The spirit to which
Tanabe refers is known as the khwan, which is a flighty essential life
force found in all living beings-and even in some natural objects,
such as rice fields and mountains.48 When a person suffers a fright or
other trauma, or is attacked by a malevolent ghost, the khwan may
fly out of the body, causing physical or psychological malaise.49
Injuries are therefore viewed in terms of the traumatic effect of
harmful experiences on the khwan. o When the khwan escapes, a
ritual must be performed to recall it and bind it securely into the
body with sacred string." The compensation sometimes paid by an
injurer to an injury victim is known as kha tham khwan, or payment
for the khwan ceremony. 5 2 According to village-based customary
law, the entire community has a stake in seeing that the injurer
provides compensation, since relational understandings of the Self
create the sense that all have been harmed by the injury. Moreover, a
family member or villager whose khwan has flown away is a
dysfunctional and potentially harmful member of the community."
Following traditional practices for recalling the khwan,
Pinkaeo's mother went with a friend to the accident site and
performed a ceremony to scoop up Pinkaeo's lost khwan with a
fishnet and implore the khwan to stay in Pinkaeo's body and not take
flight again. Because Pinkaeo no longer lived in an integrated village
community, however, it could not be said that her injury had a direct
effect on a relational network of fellow villagers. The impact of her
injury was individuated, affecting only Pinkaeo.

47. Shigeharu

Tanabe,

The Person in Transformation: Body, Mind and Cultural

Appropriation, in CULTURAL CRISIS AND SOCIAL MEMORY: MODERNITY AND IDENTITY IN

THAILAND AND LAOS 43, 48-49 (Shigeharu Tanabe & Charles F. Keyes eds., 2002).
48. Id at 44. Each human is thought to possess thirty-two khwan located in different parts of
the body. See PHAYA ANUMAN RAJADHON, KHWAN LAE PRAPHENI KAN THAM KHWAN [THE
KHWAN AND CEREMONIES FOR THE KHWAN] (1963). In common speech, however, khwan are
referenced collectively.
49. See Tanabe, supra note 47, at 44.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 45.
ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 25, at 61-63.
Id. at 63.
Id
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In addition to the khwan, each human also has a more durable
spiritual essence known as winyan, the human soul whose loss brings
death. 5 4 When a person dies, the winyan leaves the body and
continues its existence in ghostly form until it ascends to heaven and
is reborn in another bodily incarnation." When a person suffers an
abnormal or traumatic death (tai hong), the winyan requires special
care and must be ritually propitiated to ensure a smooth progression
to the next incarnation. 56 If merit-making rituals are omitted after an
abnormal death, the winyan lingers at the site of the accident in the
form of a malevolent ghost (phi tai hong), posing danger to every
passerby." The injurer in fatal accident cases has an obligation to
pay for ceremonies to propitiate and remove the winyan from the
accident site.5" Failure to do so threatens the entire community. "
Pinkaeo learned that phi tai hong resided near the accident site. They
had caused her accident and were responsible for another accident, a
fatality, just two weeks later.
Pinkaeo believes that the Self is also composed of the store of
karma people have accumulated in this life and in previous lives. She
concluded that she must have been carrying a heavy burden of nonmeritorious acts from the past, although she could not know exactly
what they were. To lighten the heavy burden of bad karma, she went
to a Buddhist temple and had the monks perform a merit-making
ceremony. Although such ceremonies sometimes involve fellow
villagers, in Pinkaeo's case, because she no longer lived in her birth
village, it was an individualized event: "I did it just for myself. I
presented food and gifts to the monks to make merit for myself and
for my own ancestral guardian spirits. It wasn't a big life-extension
ceremony [i.e., it didn't involve anyone else]. It was just for myself."
As Pinkaeo's story illustrates, the definition of an injury depends
on common-sense understandings of the Self who suffers harm. In
the traditional village society of northern Thailand, human
personalities were closely interrelated rather than sharply
individuated, but such conceptualizations have changed in recent
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 64.
Id
Id.
Id.
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years. The most important component elements of the human
personality are khwan and winyan, and most interviewees still
perceived their injuries primarily in terms of the harm done to these
spiritual elements and only secondarily to their body or property.
Yet, now that Pinkaeo no longer lives in an integrated village setting
and the loss of her khwan affects no one besides herself, it is not
clear how her injury should be understood. Should its seriousness
still be evaluated in terms of its impact on her spiritual
interconnections with others? If her birth community is no longer
relevant to her daily life, and if her identity has become more
bounded and individuated than before, it is unclear how Pinkaeo has
been injured or what should be done to make her whole. If no one
but Pinkaeo was harmed when her facial bones were shattered in the
accident, and if pursuit of a remedy would benefit her alone, it would
perhaps be wiser for her to respond with meritorious acts, with
forgiveness and compassion. By lumping the injury, she might be
able to improve her dangerously low karmic balance and protect
herself from further harm. Pinkaeo's case illustrates how changes in
the social setting can produce new conceptualizations of the Self and
injury that can lead injury victims to view lumping as the most
logical and efficacious course of action.
When considering Pinkaeo's emphasis on the intangible and
relational dimensions of her injury from an American perspective, it
may be useful to remember that similar understandings once
prevailed in our own sociolegal past. Historians tell us that AngloAmerican common law is rooted in a similar tradition. In thirteenth
century England, injuries were perceived essentially in terms of their
damage to the victim's honor and social status rather than to his or
her body. 60 Closely connected to this emphasis on the intangible
aspects of injury was a non-individuated view of the victim."
According to John Beckerman, "A wrong was still, in a very real
way, an offense against the social group (family or lordship) to
which the victim belonged." 62 Compensation for injuries, defined in
this relational sense, was aimed at readjusting and repairing relations
60. John S. Beckerman, Adding Insult to Iniuria: Affronts to Honor and the Origins of
Trespass, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAMUEL E.
THORNE 159, 172-76 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., 1981).
61. Id at 162.
62. Id
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within the community as a whole.63 Eventually, however, this
concept of injury receded and was replaced by the more
individualized and physically grounded concept that is familiar to us
today.
Yet, even our own contemporary tort law system recognizes
some forms of injury that are both intangible and relational. Indeed,
some tort law experts objected when the 1999 Discussion Draft of
the Third Restatement of Torts referenced only tangible harms-

"accidental personal injury and property damage""-in its "General
Principles" of American tort law and explicitly stated that intangible
harms such as emotional distress and economic harm fell outside
"the core of tort law." Martha Chamallas, for example, challenged
the tendency to relegate emotional and relational injuries to an
inferior status in the imagined hierarchy of American tort law. She
noted that this unfounded distinction between injury to the body and
injury to intangible interests of the person "disproportionately harms
women and has meant that law does not recognize many of the
important, recurring injuries in the lives of women."65 These
objections proved persuasive and led to an expanded
conceptualization of "injury" in the final version of the Restatement,
which included, even in its title, both "physical and emotional
harm."66
This particular fault line runs through much of the terrain of
American tort law. Consider, for example, one type of tort in which
the alleged injury is both intangible and relational: the claim for
emotional distress brought by an onlooker (typically a close relative
or spouse) who witnesses negligently inflicted physical harm to a
third party.6 7 In the late 1960s the highest courts of New York and
63. See id at 165-70.
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES, reporter's introductory note
(Discussion Draft 1999).
65. Martha Chamallas, Removing EmotionalHarmfrom the Core of Tort Liw, 54 VAND. L.
REv. 751, 752 (2001). Goldberg and Zipursky lodged a related objection, noting that the
treatment of "duty" was too narrow and had the effect, among other things, of excluding
intangible and relational injuries. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The
Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REv. 657, 659-63
(2001).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, at 1
(2010) (discussing the legally cognizable harms addressed therein).
67. For a discussion of the relational and gendered aspects of so-called "bystander" claims
for emotional distress, see CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 7, at 113-17.
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California famously split over the question of recognizing such
claims. The California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg" permitted
recovery as long as the plaintiff, in this case the victim's mother,
could prove that her emotional harm (with accompanying physical
manifestations) was foreseeable to the negligent actor."6 The Dillon
court set forth three factors to consider in establishing foreseeability:
(1) location near the scene of the accident; (2) shock resulting from
"a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff'; and (3) close relationship
between plaintiff and victim." At roughly the same time, however,
the New York Court of Appeals denied a similar claim in Tobin v.
Grossman,"1 a case brought by a mother who witnessed an
automobile accident in which her child suffered serious physical
injuries. 72 Although the Tobin court did not doubt the genuineness of
the mother's anguish, it refused to hold a negligent actor liable for
the emotional repercussions on a third party of the physical injuries
the defendant had inflicted on a direct victim, even when the plaintiff
Expressing
suffered accompanying physical manifestations."
concern over the endless ripple effects of negligently caused injuries
throughout the direct victim's relational network, the court
concluded:
The risks of indirect harm from the loss or injury of loved
ones is pervasive and inevitably realized at one time or
another. Only a very small part of that risk is brought about
by the culpable act of others. This is the risk of living and
bearing children. It is enough that the law establishes
liability in favor of those directly or intentionally harmed.
68. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
69. Id. at 920.

70. Id Subsequent decisions by the California Supreme Court varied in their treatment of
these three factors, sometimes treating them merely as illustrative of the analysis of foreseeability,
as in Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d I (Cal. 1985), and other times treating them as fixed
prerequisites for recovery, as in Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). Chamallas and
Wriggins observe that "some variation of Dillon is now in force in twenty-nine states."
CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 7, at 114.

71. 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969)
72. Id. at 424.
73. Id. at 423-24. In Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 844 (N.Y. 1984), this rule was
modified to allow recovery if the plaintiff was within the zone of danger and observed "serious
physical injury or death inflicted by the defendant's conduct on a member of the plaintiffs

immediate family in his presence."
74. Tobin, 249 N.E.2d at 424.
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In short, the Tobin court viewed the mother's emotional harm as an
inevitable part of life, as a cost of having children who are vulnerable
to harms of many kinds. The plaintiff in Tobin did not, legally
speaking, suffer an injury at the hands of the defendant; she merely
experienced the anguish that inevitably accompanies the vicissitudes
of a close and loving relationship such as that of parent and child. If
we could even label her suffering as an "injury," it was, in the eyes
of the New York Court of Appeals, an injury without a remedy.
The Tobin decision signals a view of injury and the Self that is
quite different from that which traditionally prevailed in northern
Thai village society. There, the essence of any harm was understood
to be its impact on the victim's spiritual essence, not merely her
body, and damage.to the spirit by definition harmed not only the
individual but also the relational network in which she was
embedded. Members of the family and the community-if one still
existed-had a direct stake in making sure that the injurer paid
compensation and that the proper rituals were performed. In Tobin,
by contrast, the court viewed harms to the intangible aspects of the
Self with suspicion-how could they be distinguished from the
ordinary stresses and anxieties of human existence? In addition, the
case was also weakened by the perceived piggy-backing of the
plaintiffs claim on a physical injury suffered by another person to
whom she was closely related. A more sharply individuated concept
of the human personality, and one that was more grounded in the
body itself, led the Tobin court to conclude that this was not the sort
of injury that tort law should compensate, if indeed it was properly
viewed as an injury at all.
In the American setting, the ambivalent view of claims for
intangible harms is not confined to appellate judges. The popular
media, policymakers, and members of the general public often
express skepticism or even dismay over claims for emotional or
psychological suffering." Indeed, the movement to cap damage
awards has achieved its greatest success in the area of pain and
suffering."7 There is a widespread-but by no means unanimous75. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 7, at 850-5 1; Robert S. Peck, Violating the Inviolate: Caps
on Damages and the Right to a Trial by Jury, 31 U. DAYTON L. REv. 307, 307 (2006).
76. Cf Noneconomic Damages Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, http://www.atra.org/

issues/index.php?issue=7340 (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (listing state-by-state limitations on
noneconomic damage awards).
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perception in American society that such intangible injuries are less
real or that they are impossible to distinguish from the ordinary
traumas that every person suffers in daily life. 7 A more individuated
sense of the Self supports the position that we should bear the cost of
emotional traumas ourselves rather than blame others." The use of
the courts to enforce such claims, from this perspective, symbolizes
the overreaching and greed that have caused American tort law to
spin out of control."
This consideration of intangible and relational harms illustrates a
broader point: the very concept of an "injury" is a cultural construct
and is inextricably linked to prevalent understandings of the Self who
suffers harm.8 oMany other examples could be cited to illustrate how
common-sense understandings produce shared perceptions of the
injured-or non-injured-Self. Sarah S. Lochlann Jain, in her study
of injuries associated with product design, offers one such example."
She describes how serious back injuries suffered by Mexican farm
workers using the short-handled hoe came to be characterized as
non-injuries or as inevitable side effects of farm labor explainable in
large part by a supposed racially based "congenital predisposition

. .

. to back injury."82 Racist and class-based perceptions

of the farm workers led to the conclusion-by others, of coursethat the laborers had not been injured but that their suffering was the
inevitable byproduct of who they were and of the work that was their
lot to perform. 8

If lumping is indeed the default mode for handling injury cases,
an explanation of its predominance must surely take into account this
sort of interpretive process by which human suffering gets explained.
Concepts of injury and the Self may be imposed by others, may
emanate from the individual or groups who suffer harm, may be
contested, or may emerge from a mutually constitutive process of
77. See, e.g., Chamallas,supra note 65, at 755-56.
78. Engel, supra note 27, at 559. See generally ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 25 (noting that

Thai injury victims who have left their integrated village communities tend to view their mishaps
in terms of their own moral and financial responsibility and do not aggressively pursue remedies
from their injurers).
79. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 75, at 307.
80. See ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 25, at 10.
81. JAIN, supra note 44.
82. Id. at 78.

83. Id. at 77-78.
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give-and-take involving the victims, injurers, and other groups.84 As
a result, harms that are technically caused by torts may not be
perceived as injuries at all or may come to be perceived as injuries
only with the passage of time. If and when they are perceived as
injuries, common-sense understandings of the Self may nonetheless
lead the injury victim, her social network, or third parties to view
them as relatively trivial or inevitable. And even when injuries are
not considered trivial, assumptions about the makeup of the human
personality may lead to the conclusion that the injured Self cannot be
made whole by requiring that the injurer pay compensation. This was
the conclusion reached by Pinkaeo (who received only 5,000 baht for
her devastating injuries), by Prayat, and by many other interviewees
in Thailand, who explained that the aggressive pursuit of a remedy
would create more bad karma and increase the risk of future harm to
themselves and their families.
IV. CULTURAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
CAUSATION AND RESPONSBILITY

The preceding part examined connections between lumping and
concepts of injury and the Self. This part explores connections
between lumping and the cultural construction of causation. I will
suggest that ideas about causation are, in practice, linked to ideas
about moral responsibility for injury, even though causation and
responsibility are theoretically distinct and independent of one
another. The starting point again is an injury narrative from northern
Thailand. Here, the interviewee is a thirty-eight-year-old farmer
named Thipha, who was involved in a serious motorcycle accident
while traveling with her husband to the market where they planned to
sell their newly harvested vegetables. Thipha's injury cost her a great
deal of money, particularly because she and her husband could not
harvest and sell their crop of green beans. She also suffered
potentially compensable pain and suffering. Yet, Thipha and her
husband felt sorry for the other driver and eventually settled with
him for a token payment of only 3,000 baht (then approximately
$75).
84. See generally David M. Engel, Injury and Identity: The Damaged Self in Three Cultures,
in BETWEEN LAW AND CULTURE: RELOCATING LEGAL STUDIEs 3 (David Theo Goldberg et al.

eds., 2001) (discussing the related conceptualizations of individual identity and responsibility for
the infliction of injury in three different cultural settings).
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One of the remarkable features of the stories told by all the Thai
interviewees is the multiplicity of causes they cited. Living as they
did in a complex world marked by contending, conflicting, and
sometimes overlapping belief systems and interpretive frameworks,
the interviewees shifted readily from one causal explanation to
another, seemingly untroubled by any apparent inconsistency. Each
causal explanation carried with it a different set of assumptions about
the attribution of responsibility for injuries. With the breakdown of
village-level customary law during a period of dramatic
socioeconomic change in the late twentieth century, these multiple
interpretive frameworks had become increasingly fragmented."
Rather than pointing collectively to the injurer's obligation to pay
kha tham khwan, they seemed individually to lead injury victims to
the conclusion that they were responsible for their own mishaps and
that no other party should pay compensation.
CausalRole of a Ghost by the Side of the Road
As we have seen, when individuals experience a traumatic or
abnormal death, their souls may linger at the scene of the accident in
the form of malevolent ghosts unless proper rituals are performed.
These ghosts, known as phi tai hong, are often cited as the causes of
accidents and injuries, for they attempt to kill passersby so that new
souls will fall by the roadside and release the phi tai hong to resume
their progression toward reincarnation." Theories of causation and
responsibility that point to a malevolent ghost, disconnected
nowadays from the broader structure of customary village law, tend
to contradict the idea that the other party to the accident owes
compensation. " If the injury has any remedy at all, it is one that the
victims themselves should provide.
Thipha acknowledges the existence of such ghosts, and she even
describes the ritual that is performed to propitiate the souls of
accident victims so they do not become phi tai hong:
They take sand and place it on a tray, or on some other
object, and shape it into one hundred mounds, which they
85. See generally ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 25, at 33-46 (discussing globalization in

Chiangmai from 1975 to the present with particular attention to demographic, economic,
technological, and ideological transformations).
86. Id at 64.
87. Id. at 70.
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call "sand stupas." Then they place a flag with red cloth just
at that spot: "Here a person died from an accident." They
say that if they do this, the one who died will be able to
leave and won't have to stay at that spot. The dead person,
that is, the ghost, should not just stay there. It should be
released and allowed to go ahead to seek food and make
merit .... [Otherwise] people will die there where the
original death occurred. Others will die as well. They say
that the first person to die, he wants to change places. If
someone else dies, he will be able to leave. He won't have
to stay there.
Thipha was not surprised that onlookers blamed a ghost by the
roadside for her accident after a drunk motorcyclist tried to turn
directly in front of her and her husband. The fact that the accident
took place near the entrance of a slaughterhouse, a place of death
and-from a Buddhist perspective-of sinful activity, made it all the
more plausible that a ghost might be the cause: "The people at the
slaughterhouse said, 'Oh, it's happened again. The ghost blocked the
view."'
The ghost's role was confirmed by a spirit medium after the
accident. The spirit medium told Thipha's mother that the ghost in
front of the slaughterhouse was hungry because no one had recently
offered any lap (spicy minced pork, a food typically offered to
ghosts): "It wants to eat lap, let it eat! It can't eat by itself." Thipha's
mother followed the instructions of the spirit medium, prepared the
offering, and presented it to the ghost at the accident site. Thipha
observed that propitiating the ghost brought reassurance and restored
her energy. The "remedy" in this sense was provided by Thipha and
her mother, and not by the other driver.
Nevertheless, Thipha expresses some skepticism about this
supernatural causal explanation. She acknowledges, "Yes, there are
ghosts. I believe in them. There are ghosts." In her case, however,
she thinks the ghost played a minor role at most, because it obscured
the vision of the oncoming driver but not Thipha's husband, who
asserted that he could clearly see the oncoming vehicle. Thipha
therefore concludes that other causal factors had greater importance.
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Negligence as a Cause of lnjury
Thipha states at several points in the interview that her accident
was caused by negligence. One might think that this causal
explanation would point to the responsibility of the other driver, and
that lumping would therefore seem inappropriate, but Thipha's
understanding of the concept of negligence differs from that of
American tort law. Thipha assumes that negligence means lack of
"mindfulness" (sati) by both parties and particularly by her own
husband, who was inattentive and speeding. " Negligence, for Thipha
and other interviewees, is more consistent with attribution of
responsibility to oneself than to the other party. In a distinctive
version of what we might call contributory negligence, Thipha and
others express the assumption that, in a world of careless actors, one
can and should protect oneself from harm by exercising the Buddhist
virtue of mindfulness:
A vehicle approaches, and if we aren't negligent we will
see that it is coming and we will stop. Then we won't be
injured. That's what they say. To do something incorrect
and not to exercise care for our own safety, that's
negligence. We may be injured, we may lose our life
because of our negligence.
Thus, even causal explanations premised on the other party's
negligence do not in themselves lead to the conclusion that he or she
should provide a remedy.
Karma as Causation
Thailand is a predominantly Buddhist country, but at the village
level Buddhism is extensively mixed with non-Buddhist elements,
including spirit worship and astrology." Thipha, like all the other
interviewees, cited karma as a primary cause of her injury. Although
karma (in Thai, kam) is a central tenet of Buddhism, villagers tend to
refer to it as khro-kam, literally fate-karma. This term refers not only
88. Sati, or mindfulness, is one of the components of the Eightfold Path leading to the
cessation of suffering according to Buddhist teaching. See SULAK SIVARAKSA, SEEDS OF PEACE:
A BUDDHIST VISION FOR RENEWING SOCIETY 63-64 (1992). "Sati denotes self-watchfulness,
which is to distance or detach oneself from one's thoughts and actions and so attain mental and
moral equilibrium." PETER A. JACKSON, BUDDHADASA: THERAVADA BUDDHISM AND
MODERNIST REFORM IN THAILAND 135 (2003). A more detailed discussion of the connection
between negligence and sati appears in ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 25, at 73.
89. ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 25, at 6, 61.
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to the victim's insufficient store of merit but also to the role of the
stars." In Thipha's causal explanation, therefore, we see both
Buddhist and non-Buddhist elements seamlessly combined:
Some people go to consult [specialists], they have their
palms read. They can avoid injuries. The palm reader tells
them, "You have khro. You shouldn't travel." If they know
this, then they don't go out. They can avoid any mishap.
But if we don't have our palms read or our fortunes told,
then we don't know that our khro is just ahead. We don't
know where and when it will find us. Without knowing, we
go ahead and we encounter it.
Khro comes from things we've done in the past. We
don't know who was involved, or what we did. We don't
know this. What we did follows us into the present .... We
worked in the vegetable fields. We tilled the soil and
uprooted the plants, and we may have harmed insects or
other creatures. It seems that our khro attached itself to us
without our knowing it .... Those insects didn't die, but
we didn't see them. We caused them some mnury.....
Those creatures, whatever they were, we injured them
without killing them. Then we left them alone. That bad
karma attached itself to us.
An implicit assumption about responsibility emerges from
Thipha's discussion of khro-kam. The accident was caused by her
own misdeeds, by the bad karma she and her husband acquired when
they unwittingly injured or killed tiny creatures while tilling the soil,
and by their failure to learn their fortunes and stay home when there
was great risk of harm. Nowadays, with the breakdown of traditional
village-level remediation procedures, injury victims view this theory
of causation as inconsistent with an attribution of responsibility to
the other driver. In order to avoid creating more bad karma, they
conclude that lumping is a more appropriate response than
aggressively seeking a remedy.
CausalRole of Unheeded Premonitions
Consistent with the theory of khro-kam just discussed, Thipha
and many other interviewees cite important signs and premonitions
90. Id. at 74.
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of harm that preceded their injuries. In this sense, the cause of
Thipha's accident was her own failure to heed these signs. One such
sign was her husband's severe headache: "He must have had khro
that day. His khro was very bad then. [The headache] was a sign, it
was a premonition. It was a warning to us, because we weren't aware
at that point." A second sign was her husband's uncharacteristically
reckless driving and his irritability. On his way home from work,
before they left for the market with their load of green beans, he had
nearly struck an old man. After they loaded the motorcycle and
began their journey to the market, Thipha warned him to slow down.
Normally he would respond with a good-natured joke, but that day
he answered ominously: "Oh, are you afraid to die?"
Both of these signs should have alerted Thipha and her husband
that misfortune was about to strike. She should have stayed home,
performed merit-making ceremonies, or exercised special care.
Instead, she ignored the signs and proceeded to the location where
the accident occurred. The cause of her mishap in this sense was her
own failure to heed the warnings. Thipha concluded that she herself
bore primary responsibility for the injury.
Two aspects of Thipha's story are especially striking. First, the
multiplicity of causation reveals the fractured conceptual world in
which she lives, where different reality frames contend, overlap, and
intermingle. In this world, causation is overdetermined. 9 1 Different
explanations draw on different practices and belief systems and serve
different functions. Second, each causal explanation is associated
with a particular set of ideas about the attribution of responsibility. In
Thipha's case-and her narrative is typical of most of those we heard
in the course of our fieldwork-none of the causal explanations leads
to the conclusion that the other driver is primarily responsible for her
injury. Whether the cause was fate, karma, negligence, a ghost, or the
failure to heed a premonition, the ultimate responsibility rests with
Thipha and her husband, because their carelessness, inadvertence,
inattention, or lack of mindfulness made the injury inevitable. When
the injury victim considers herself responsible for her own
misfortune, lumping may seem the most obvious and appropriate
response.

91. See ENGEL& ENGEL, supra note 25, at 24-28.
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The cultural construction of causation helps to explain the
widespread practice of lumping. When causal explanations point
back to the injury victim, as they did in Thipha's case, there appears
to be no justification for demanding a remedy from someone else.
But causation is a notorious black hole. In the American tort law
tradition, causation is usually considered a necessary element that
must be established independently, without regard to evidence of
culpability or moral responsibility.9 2 Courts should treat "actual"
causation, or "causation in fact," as a straightforward empirical
question, as a trail of objectively verifiable breadcrumbs that either
does or does not lead to the defendant's door. Yet some
commentators have observed that causation is anything but
straightforward and is by no means susceptible to simple objective
tests. The determination of causation, as Wex S. Malone pointed out
many years ago, inevitably conflates objective factual inquiries with
underlying theories about responsibility for injury." It is perhaps
inescapable that humans conduct their causal inquiries within a
framework of assumptions about moral responsibility for injuries and
injury prevention. As Ann Scales has observed, "In U.S. legal
culture, causation has been the justifying glue that sticks a defendant
to a plaintiff."94
American tort law is full of examples illustrating the conflation
of ideas about responsibility and causation, notwithstanding the fact
that causation is theoretically a separate and independent element of
an injury case. One example appears in the diethylstilbestrol (DES)
cases and, in particular, the New York case of Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly
& Co." As in most of the DES lawsuits, the plaintiff in Hymowitz
was unable to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
negligence of any of the DES manufacturers caused her injury
because she could not determine which pills her mother had taken
when pregnant." The New York Court of Appeals adopted a
distinctive version of market-share liability in response to this
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (2010); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
93. Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 97 (1956).
94. Ann Scales, "Nobody Broke It, It Just Broke": Causation as an Instrument of
Obfuscation and Oppression, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE, supra note
4, at 269, 272.
95. 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989).
96. Id. at 1075.

Fall 2010]

LUMPING AS DEFA ULT

61

dilemma, ruling that the plaintiff could recover a percentage of her
damages from each pharmaceutical company that sold DES for use
by pregnant mothers based on the share of the national market the
company controlled." In this approach, the question of causation
was explicitly merged with the question of moral responsibility
rather than regarded as an independent element of plaintiffs prima
facie case: "[W]e choose to apportion liability so as to correspond to
the over-all culpability of each defendant, measured by the amount
of risk of injury each defendant created to the public-at-large."" To
make it unmistakably clear that the new theory of causation had been
fashioned to reflect a prior determination of moral responsibility, the
court went on to hold that a defendant could be liable even if it could
prove conclusively that it was not the cause of plaintiff s injury:
[T]here should be no exculpation of a defendant who,
although a member of the market producing DES for
pregnancy use, appears not to have caused a particular
plaintiffs injury. It is merely a windfall for a producer to
escape liability solely because it manufactured a more
identifiable pill, or sold only to certain drugstores. These
fortuities in no way diminish the culpability of a defendant
for marketing the product, which is the basis of liability
here.9 "
A similar example of the conflation of theories of causation and
responsibility in contemporary American tort law is found in the
controversial doctrine of "lost chance." In these cases, thus far
confined to medical malpractice claims, the plaintiff is by definition
unable to prove as a factual matter-by a preponderance of the
evidence-that the negligent doctor was a but-for cause of his or her
injury, yet the plaintiff is able to prove that the negligent act reduced
the odds for a favorable outcome in a case involving a preexisting
condition. ' Courts that have adopted the lost chance theory allow
the plaintiff to recover a percentage of his or her damages based on
the percentage likelihood of a better outcome that was lost due to the

97. Id. at 1078.
98. Id.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. See, e.g., Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990); Alberts v. Schultz,
975 P.2d 1279 (N.M. 1999).
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negligent act. 101 Even though the doctor's negligence probably did
not cause the plaintiffs injury, it did cause something. It caused a
window of opportunity to close and therefore deprived the plaintiff
of a chance to avoid harm. 102 The plaintiff is entitled to sue for the
lost chance, even if she cannot sue for the injury itself. 10 Yet surely
this causal explanation is no more than a verbal smokescreen. The
plaintiff is not really awarded damages for the lost chance in itself,
since he or she can recover nothing under this theory if a doctor
negligently reduces the plaintiff s odds and yet the plaintiff somehow
manages to avoid injury. Lost chance theory is really a roundabout
way of using causal language to express a theory of moral
responsibility for injuries: even when the prognosis is not good and a
bad outcome is likely no matter what treatment is provided, a doctor
still has an obligation to provide the usual professional standards of
care and may be held liable for failing to do so if an injury does
occur despite the lack of a preponderance of evidence establishing
but-for causation.
Both of these examples illustrate the tight connection between
theories of causation and theories of responsibility. Indeed, in some
cases, theories of responsibility come prior to, trump, or distort the
causal explanations offered by judges and commentators. The
supposedly simple, neutral, and factual causal inquiries that link a
particular defendant to a particular plaintiff actually make up a
broader moral inquiry that is anything but simple and is often hidden
from view. Conclusions about causation and responsibility for
injuries are culturally constructed, and they can take on the
appearance of common sense. If, as in Thipha's case, common sense
does not attribute causation or moral responsibility for an injury to
another person or entity, then it may seem completely unremarkable
that an injury victim should settle for lumping rather than
aggressively pursue a remedy.
Jain, in the study of product-related injuries discussed above,
further illustrates how the cultural construction of causation
reinforces lumping as the predominant outcome when individuals
101.

See Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 48.

102. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1354 (1981)

(stating an early version of the lost-chance theory).
103. See id. at 1365.
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suffer product-related injuries. '" She suggests that such injuries are
not anomalous accidents but that harmful interactions between
humans and products are built into the system of production and
consumption. "0'Injuries result from an unspoken common-sense
distribution of risk and suffering to particular groups in society. 106
From this perspective, lumping should not be understood as a
rational, or even a conscious, choice made by individuals who are
injured by defective products. Rather, lumping flows inevitably from
the construction of a shared common sense about injuries that creates
"of course" meanings around concepts such as causation and
responsibility. "o'To follow any path other than lumping appears
absurd.
In Jain's view, tort law plays a key role in the social
construction of injuries. The law is "a crucial discourse in
rationalizing the distribution of the inevitable and integral costs of
commodity culture." 1' In terms of the analysis offered in this
Article, Jain would appear to suggest that tort law helps to shape
societal understandings of causation and responsibility and, by
logical extension, the rules of tort law lead many injury victims to
accept lumping as a matter of common sense: "[I]njury laws
constitute the terms for understanding human wounding in the
United States and continually reset the terms of its acceptability." 1o9
It is no doubt true that legal doctrine can influence the interpretive
frames through which ordinary people experience everyday harms,
but this is not invariably the case. "oAs the Thai examples illustrate,
popular perceptions of causation and responsibility may bear little, if
any, relationship to official legal categories and may not be
influenced by legal doctrine in any perceptible way. The professional
discourse of Thai tort law and the language used by lawyers and
judges in formal institutional settings are almost totally disconnected

104. JAIN, supra note 44, at 151-55.
105. See id at 56.
106. See id at 151-53.
107. See id. at 28-29.
108. Id at 155.
109. Id. at 151.
110. See David M. Engel, Discourses of Causation in Injury Cases: Exploring Thai and
American Legal Cultures, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE, supra note 4, at
251,252-54.
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from the discourses of injury that are familiar to ordinary people in
Chiangmai and seem to have little, if any, constitutive effect. "'
In addition to suggesting, as Jain does, that formal law can shape
the perceptions of ordinary people, it is crucially important to ask
how popular understandings of causation and responsibility affect the
tort law system. The fact that only sixty-six personal injury cases
were filed in the Chiangmai Provincial Court over the six-year period
from 1992 to 1997-an average of only eleven cases per year in a
population of more than 1,330,000 people-is certainly connected to
the popular perception that most injuries are caused by the victims
themselves. The predominance of causal explanations pointing away
from the injurer contributes to the widespread popular view that tort
litigation is irrelevant and unnecessary, which in turn leads injury
victims toward lumping. The roots of these common-sense views of
causation, responsibility, and lumping are not to be found primarily
in Thai tort law but in the social, economic, and ideological
transformations northern Thailand has experienced during the past
several decades.
Randolph E. Bergstrom is one of the few writers who have
attempted to show how shifts in popular ideas about causation in a
particular social setting can affect the behavior of the tort law system
as a whole. 112 Bergstrom contends that changing views of causation
in New York City from 1870 to 1910 produced a sharp increase in
tort litigation at the turn of the twentieth century. "' In the earlier
years of this time period, according to Bergstrom, New Yorkers
tended to view accidents as inevitable and their own suffering as
fate-a view of causation that in some ways resembles that of the
accident victims in northern Thailand. 114 This distinctive perspective
on the issue of causation discouraged New Yorkers from attributing
responsibility for injuries to other people and therefore rendered tort
law irrelevant for most injury victims. "

Bergstrom suggests, however, that by 1910 New Yorkers tended
to embrace a broader concept of causation and were more inclined to
111. See ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 25, at 47-66.
112. See RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN NEW YORK
CITY, 1870-1910, at 167 (1992).
113. See id. at 167-75.
114. Id. at 168-69.
115. See id.

Fall 20 10]

LUMPING AS DEFA ULT

65

search for remote causes that originated in the misdeeds of other
human actors. 116 This new view of causation, significantly, was
associated with new views about moral responsibility, or in
Bergstrom's words, with a "great surge in society's sense of duty to
others ... a moral regeneration." ' Abandoning their earlier
tendency to view accidents as inevitable and lumping as the
appropriate response in most cases, New Yorkers increasingly
viewed their suffering in terms of the moral responsibilities citizens
owed one another in what Bergstrom terms an "interdependent"
society. "' The transformation in ideas about causation and moral
responsibility resulted in a reduced tendency for New Yorkers to
settle for lumping as an outcome and an increased tendency to
invoke tort law.
If such a shift in accident perception actually took place in New
York at the turn of the twentieth century, it appears that the opposite
trend may now be underway in northern Thailand. There,
transformations in ideas about causation and moral responsibility
have increased the tendency for injured persons to settle for lumping.
Before the economic and demographic dislocations associated with
extensive global influences in the late twentieth century, injured
villagers expected and usually received a remedy. Injuries were
understood to affect a network of villagers and not just the person
who suffered direct physical harm. The good of the village required
that the injurer pay compensation to ensure that the necessary rituals
were performed. A well-established customary law operated at the
village level to define and enforce such obligations, and local
authority figures-particularly the village and the subdistrict chiefmade sure that injurers and victims usually followed customary
procedures. When injurers refused to satisfy their obligations to
injury victims, however, cases were sometimes brought to the
Provincial Court. In those instances, the formal legal system exerted
pressure on the injurer to pay compensation, which was measured by
the norms of customary law rather than state law, and the lawsuits
were generally withdrawn as soon as traditional obligations were
satisfied.
116. Id at l68.
117. Id. at 182.
118. Id. at 175-76.
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During the final decades of the twentieth century, however, Thai
villagers tended increasingly to live and work outside their home
communities. Injuries occurred beyond the jurisdiction of traditional
village leaders, and the customary laws and rituals themselves grew
dim in the memories of those who suffered injuries. Instead of
interpreting their injuries through the frameworks that had been
familiar to their parents and grandparents, injury victims relied on a
new, delocalized form of Buddhism that was stripped of its close
connection to village spirit worship. As our interviewees told us,
their understanding of Buddhism in its reconstituted form counseled
them to absorb the harm rather than pursue a remedy, and there was
no village community to persuade them otherwise. The descriptions
of causation and responsibility that Prayat, Pinkaeo, and Thipha
provide in their injury narratives are typical in this regard. Although
fragmentary elements of longstanding belief systems are still present,
they no longer have any connection to customary remedial practices
that had long prevailed at the village level. For the three of them, as
for other interviewees, responsibility for suffering rests primarily
with the victim. The formal legal system is more irrelevant than ever,
since there is no village customary legal system for which Thai tort
law might serve as a forum of last resort. Social and demographic
changes have spawned new ways of thinking about causation and
responsibility for injury. Unlike the situation Bergstrom describes in
late nineteenth-century New York, the result in Thailand is an
increase in lumping and a decrease in tort litigation almost to the
vanishing point.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed the most prevalent outcome in injury
cases-lumping. A better understanding of lumping may shed light
on the broader issue of injuries without remedies, since individuals
who respond to injuries by absorbing the burden of the harm they
have experienced, or who settle for mere token payments by the
injurer or others, have by definition gone without a remedy. I have
argued that lumping can be understood not just as an early yes-or-no
decision point in the injury pyramid but as a form of socially
constructed common sense. Drawing on the case studies of Prayat,
Pinkaeo, and Thipha in northern Thailand, I have proposed a
methodology for analyzing lumping as cultural practice.
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Specifically, I have suggested that lumping can be understood
through the intersection of ideas and practices concerning injuries
and causation. I have argued that both injuries and causation should
be viewed not simply as objectively ascertainable facts, but as social
constructs that vary across time, place, and circumstance. I have
urged in particular that injuries should be considered in relation to
common-sense understandings of the Self, and that causation should
be considered in relation to common-sense understandings of moral
responsibility. Injury and the Self, causation and responsibility, are
not, however, monolithic concepts. There is no such thing as a Thai
view of such matters, or an American, a Japanese, or a German view.
Within any society, multiple and contested viewpoints can be
identified, and the production and distribution of knowledge systems
across different social groups must always be considered. To invoke
"culture" is a risky business these days, and one must explicitly
avoid-and disclaim-essentialism. But for lawyers, who too often
dismiss the value of ethnographic insights, there is more to be lost by
ignoring the cultural dimensions of tort law than by treading too
close to the pit of essentialism or orientalism. "' As I have tried to
demonstrate in this Article, we cannot get very far in understanding
lumping if we assume that it is enough to examine the costs and
benefits facing injury victims at each decision point, without paying
close attention to the local practices, belief systems, conceptual
categories, and ideologies on which the relevant actors rely as they
interpret and give meaning to their experiences.
Any map of lumping as a form of social practice must be
attentive to the constitutive processes that give common-sense
meanings to "injury" and "causation" in particular social
circumstances. The map of lumping becomes three-dimensional as it
takes into account the different ways in which these concepts can be
framed, not just by different social groups, but by each individual
injury victim who must cope with a number of overlapping and
sometimes conflicting frameworks for interpreting his or her
experiences. A fourth dimension is added to the map of lumping
when it is recognized that these frameworks evolve over time and
that they interrelate differently with one another as social
circumstances change. Exploring these maps, indeed simply
119. See Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REv. 179, 204-05, 233-34(2002).
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recognizing that they exist, should improve our understanding of
lumping as the default mode of handling injury cases and should help
to explain why most injuries go without remedies.

